loosely formulated that they leave major issues to the discretion of member states and national policy communities? In order to answer these questions, this paper compares similarities and variations in regulatory reforms in the telecoms and electricity sectors in Spain and Portugal and examines the impact of Europeanization on (a) similarities across both sectors and nations; (b) similarities across sectors and variations across nations; (c) variations across sectors and similarities across nations; and (d) variations across both sectors and nations. We observe how the different cases evolved before and after the creation of the EU regimes, looking at both the Europeanization of markets (that is, creation of single European market) and the Europeanization of governance (that is, the creation of a distinctive European model of public control over private action). In doing so, the paper examines also the limits of the single market and the process of Europeanization.
Europeanization has many faces. Olsen (2003) mentions five: (1) changes in external territorial boundaries; (2) the development of institutions of governance at the European level; (3) the penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance by the centre; (4) the export of forms of political organization and governance that are typical of and distinct for Europe; and (5) a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe. Our definition is admittedly demanding, yet it supplies clear empirical criteria for our analysis. We define Europeanization as the institutionalization of a common political and economic order at the trans-national level mainly through membership in the European Union and particularly the creation of issue-and sector-specific regimes at the EU level.
As said, we examine the impacts of Europeanization on both nations and sectors.
First, we look at the Europeanization of governance as it i s reflected at the level of the institutions of the state in Spain and Portugal and specifically in the role of the regulatory authorities, their autonomy and their relations with the ministries.
Second, we analyse the Europeanization of markets as it is reflected in the processes of privatization and the creation of competitive and open environments within and across national borders. We suggest that, if 'Europeanization matters', then the creation of EU regimes will lead to: (a) the faster and smoother advance of liberalization than otherwise; (b) similar patterns of market integration and similar institutions of governance across the two countries; (c) varying degrees of liberalization depending on the extent to which the specific European regime promotes liberalization. Specifically, we may expect the lesser degree of delegation to the EU in electricity (intergovernmental regime) to be reflected in a lesser degree of market liberalization in electricity than in telecoms where delegation to the EU regime was more extensive (supranational regime); (d) a lesser degree of neo-mercantilism (promoting national champions and interests) with the advance of Europeanization; and (e) new strategies of internationalization of market operators, corresponding to the opportunities and constraints accompanying the progress of Europeanization. The methodology and research design that we adopt in examining the process of change in light of the above criteria is discussed in the next section of the paper.
I. Case Selection and Research Design
Case selection is of particular importance in small-N analysis. We first clarify the space of variations in our cases and in particular the process of 'casing' as a tool in our step-wise design. Casing is a process of setting the boundaries of the cases, which in this paper we do in three dimensions. The first type of case includes two regulatory regimes at the European level; section II compares the 1993 European regime for telecoms with the 1996 European regime for electricity (see Table 1 ).
Our second type of case includes eight sectoral regimes bounded by time. The first four are telecoms cases (section III) and the remainder electricity (section IV).
They are defined by time and by country; thus, we have the telecoms sector in Portugal up to 1993 or the electricity sector in Spain after 1996. Third, we have the four compound cases of telecoms and electricity and of Spain and Portugal (section V). Here we look, not at the telecoms sector in Portugal in particular, but at the telecoms sector across all countries and at Portuguese patterns of liberalization in general, that is, beyond telecoms and electricity. These comparative strategies make the inferential process more formal and transparent on the one hand and more systematic on the other. Thus, we articulate what comparativists usually leave implicit (Levi-Faur, 2004b) . At the same time, these strategies test research questions against a myriad of cases and thus potentially increase their consilience. (Sapelli, 1995; Malefakis, 1995; Giner, 1986; Medrano-Diez, 2003) . None of these similarities makes the two countries identical, and we suggest that the notions of 'liberal étatism' and 'social étatism' capture reasonably well the specific mixture of variations and similarities in Spain and Portugal. Étatism is often contrasted with liberal and corporatist patterns of state-business relations or 'styles':
Liberal-pluralist styles comprise a preference for market solutions to policy problems and use market-like structured associational systems (open network boundaries, many network members, flexibility, general accessibility of state agencies, lobbyism and limited involvement of interest associations in public policy). Étatism implies a preference for 'state' solutions to policy problems, i.e. a dominant role of the state in policymaking and in network structures and by implication a role f or interest associations limited to lobbying. Corporatism represents a preference for 'associational' solutions to policy problems, that is, selfregulation by civil society and/or delegation of public policy to interest associations, and framework regulation facilitating this. The network structures are characterized by relatively small size, closed boundaries, privileged access, representational monopolies and stability over time . (Waarden, 1999, 104) These ideal types of policy style are often exemplified in paradigmatic cases.
Thus, France is usually the paradigmatic case for étatism, Britain (and the US) for liberal-pluralism and the Scandinavian countries for corporatism. Note that these are theoretical constructions to which, obviously, individual nations constitute better or worse fits. Why étatism for Spain and Portugal? At the most obvious level, étatism is a default option that captures the characteristics of these polities much better than the notions of liberal-pluralism and corporatism. Liberalpluralism is usually identified with the Anglo-Saxon countries, and its major characteristics are largely foreign to Spain and Portugal (although less so the former than the latter). As for corporatism, Spain and Portugal are both low on trade union memb ership, have highly concentrated public administration and industrial sectors, and have relatively weak employer associations. As well, étatism seems to capture some important characteristics, such as a history of late industrialization in both countries that is associated generally with a much more active role for government than in liberal economies and societies (Gerschenkron, 1962) . Another important aspect in both countries is the historical centralization of power in their domestic business community and society as well as in their colonial administration. Spain, however, moved faster with industrialization and was less centralized than Portugal, and always had strong domestic civil opposition to the centre (thus, Portugal did not experience a civil war). More recently, in Portugal it was the armed forces that led the insurrection that resulted in democratization (April 1974) . In Spain, it was the death of General Franco that triggered the transition, which was led by regime reformists and the monarchy (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Maxwell, 1995) . Another notable difference in the degree of étatism is the significant territorial decentralization that has occurred in Spain in the democratic era but not in Portugal.
A second adjective is necessary in order to refine the commonalities of étatism in the two countries. Liberal étatism seems to us to capture the essence of government-business relations in Spain, while social étatism seems to fit the Portuguese case. Liberal étatism signifies the existence of a stronger business community in Spain than in Portugal. This is best reflected in the structure of the financial system, notably the existence of private banks (BBVA and BSCH) that exercise control over a wide array of private (and privatized) business in Spain in contrast to the dominance of a public bank in Portugal (CGD). Social étatism best captures the Portuguese system since it better reflects the strong social orientation of the Portuguese revolution and constitution (Fishman, 2003) . It might also be reflected in the fact that, while for most of the post-war period the Spanish expenditures on social protection were larger than the Portuguese, by the end of the 1990s Portugal was spending more on this item as a percentage of GDP despite being poorer than Spain (Guillen et al., 2002: 234-7) . While the health systems of both countries cover the whole population, Spanish labour policies, unlike those of interconnections are much simpler and easier to monitor. Fourth, the transportation of electricity requires grids that cost about ten times more than the transportation of telecom, which further limits the options for plurality of networks that are so essential for competition. Thus, we have good reason to expect competition in electricity to be more limited than in telecoms, and the 'goodness of fit ' between the ideas of liberalization and the realities of the sector to be greater in telecoms than in electricity.
II. Varieties of EU-level regimes
Efforts to promote European-level policies in the telecoms and electricity sectors were evident before the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and even before the rise of neo-liberalism to a hegemonic position (Kalyvas, 1994 ). Yet these early efforts were basically connected to industrial policies and the safety of energy supply. Signs of policy change in telecoms in the early 1980s included the divestiture of AT&T in the US and the privatization of Cable and Wireless and British Telecoms in the UK and of NTT in Japan. At the EU level, notable was the publication of 'Action Lines ' (1983) , which later served as the basis for the Community's telecoms plan (Schneider et al., 1994) . I n 1986 a directorate for telecoms was established in the European Commission and serve to promote a European regime in the sector. countries (but with moratoria for specific cases). Liberalization efforts that were first confined to minor segments of the market were now focused on the major ones.
In electricity, like the energy sector at large, both liberalization and Europeanization proceeded extremely slowly. True, the directorate of energy (DGXVII) was institutionalized as far back as 1968, long before the directorate for telecoms. But energy was generally considered a 'national concern' (Andersen, 1993, 134) . A modest move was the adoption of a directive in 1990 concerning the transparency of electricity and gas prices for industrial consumers. The
Commission hoped thereby to increase the bargaining power of industrial users vis-à-vis suppliers. In the same year a Transit Directive was adopted to promote open access for a third country member states that did not share a common border Midttun, 1996, 266-270) This proposal was fiercely opposed by the industry and the member states (Padgett, 1992, 69-70) . There was good reason to believe that Article 90 of the Treaty of Rome, which provides the Commission with competencies to prohibit state monopolies from engaging in anti-competitive practices, could be applied to electricity. However, the Commission opted for a cooperative procedure to facilitate consensual decision making (Schmidt, 1998) While the EU-level regime is a fact of life in both electricity and telecom sectors, the extent to which the member states transferred controlled upward to the EU level varies. Since the extent of transfer for electricity has been much more restricted than for telecoms , Levi-Faur (1999) has proposed a distinction between supranationalism in telecoms and intergovernmentalism in electricity. The lesser degree of transfer of control of electricity, and thus its intergovernmentalism, is evident in the wide discretion of member states that is recognized in four elements of the electricity directive of 1996. First, the directive allows member states to opt either for a Third Party Access (TPA) principle or for Single Buyer status. In the former case, consumers or suppliers negotiate terms of access with the operator of the grid, while in the latter case a single national operator handles all requests for import and is directly responsible for the supply of electricity to consumers.
Second, the directive opens the way for a member state to choose a system of negotiated or regulated access. Here, the question of tariffs takes centre stage. The generators and the consumers are critically dependent on the grid operator, which may abuse its power. Member states can leave tariffs and conditions of access to the electricity operators and distributors to negotiate (negotiated TPA) or they can regulate them (regulated TPA). Clearly, only the second case provides safeguards for competition, but the directive allows member states to avoid competition and Europeanization. Third, a reciprocity clause allows member states, for a period of up to nine years, to restrict import of electricity from countries that open their markets to a lesser extent. Finally, the issue of whether to allow distribution companies to shop around freely for the electricity they distribute is left to the discretion of the member states. This is a critical aspect of competition as the distribution companies are well-placed to exert pressure on generators and transmission operators to lower their electricity prices. The changes that were introduced by the new directive of 2003 do not substantially affect the differences between the EU telecoms and electricity regimes.
III. Telecoms Liberalization in Spain and Portugal
To what 
Telecom Liberalization in Spain and Portugal up to 1993
Telecoms regimes in Spain and Portugal shared some important similarities even before the er a of liberalization. Unlike almost all west European countries, Spain and Portugal did not fully nationalize their operators. In Spain, Franco's regime purchased in 1946 a controlling share of the private monopoly owned by International Telephone and Telegraph (Little, 1979 ). Yet the company, Telefonica, continued to enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy (Jordana, 2002, 87-90 -in the 1980s and even before they joined the EC/EU -is that that the state became increasingly interested in the sector and that that interest increased in the second half of the 1980s and well into the 1990s.
In April 1986, four months after Portugal joined the EC, the government set up a special commission to study the sector. The commission's report formed the basis of a Telecommunications Act of 1989, the first piece of legislation whose scope embraced the whole Portuguese telecom industry. It defined public responsibilities, guaranteed access to certain services and opened value-added services to competition. The functions of the ICP were extended and the agency was granted a certain amount of autonomy. In Spain, the government paid less attention to telecoms at that time but the trend was similar to that in Portugal, and in 1987 the Parliament approved the first telecommunications act in more than seventy years. This la w provided a clear legal framework and a clear distinction between the state and the operator. At the same time it distinguished between monopolistic and competitive services, the latter to be authorized by the government case by case.
Signs of change were evident also in the increasing tendency to open some segments of the telecoms market to competition and to make the first moves towards privatization. New legislation liberalized the equipment market in both countries in 1989. Portugal went even further by opening value -added services to competition in the same year, a step which was followed in 1992 by Spain in the context of the implementation of the 1990 EU directive on value-added services.
A major arena of change was the emerging market for mobile telephony. Portugal and achieved what other countries had had for decades: a single public operator running a monopoly (Sousa, 1996, 663) . Partly for this reason, and despite the removal of constitutional constraints, no effort was made to privatize until the government ensured the creation and consolidation of a national champion.
Some provisional conclusions about the first years of policy change can be safely made at this stage. First and fore most is the observation that the Spanish and the Portuguese started to steer the sector only in the context of democratization and before the consolidation of the European regime. Second, these governments promoted liberalization without waiting for the creation of a European regime for telecoms , but partially anticipated it. True, the steps that were taken were only modest, as they focused on relatively minor markets. Neither country privatized, but the first signs of a new approach were evident in both. It would , therefore, be misleading to see the process as one in which the European Commission is struggling against reluctant member states. Since the mid-1980s, the dynamics of market liberalization in this sector was evident even outside the context of Europeanization.
Telecom Liberalization in Portugal and Spain after 1993
The In addition, it has interests and activities in Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, El
Salvador and Puerto Rico (Rozas, 2003 here is that they were used as opportunities for modernization and, where they were believed to involve constraints on the national interest, both liberal and European principles were modified.
IV. Electricity Liberalization in Spain and Portugal
Moving now from telecoms to electricity, we first examine the changes in the Spanish and Portuguese regimes for electricity up to 1996. We then move to a comparative analysis of the two countries' electricity policies from 1996 onwards under the new European regime (steps 4 and 5 in Table 1 ). Our analysis shows that both countries continued making significant attempts at liberalization even before 1996. This is particularly true in respect of privatization, but we also identify clear efforts to promote competitive arrangements and to redesign the structure of governance at the national level in the two countries especially with regard to the generation sector. While efforts to promote competition were not successful, and liberalization was implemented only in the post-1996 era, our research once again throws doubt on the argument that Europeanization was the major driving force for change in the two countries.
Electricity Liberalization in Spain and Portugal up to 1996
While Spanish electricity supply had already been proclaimed a public service in 1924, private suppliers dominated the governance regime and limited the role of the state. Thus, planning for electricity growth was in the hands of the association of electricity suppliers (UNESA) until the 1970s, and only thereafter was it transferred to t he government. Indeed, the first comprehensive framework for electricity regulation in Spain was the 1994 law (LOSEN ). The major public institution was Endesa, which was established by the Franco regime in 1944.
Endesa was expected to construct and operate thermo -generators using local coal and thus to contribute to the import-substitution strategy of the state. It operated as a minor actor in a market that was largely supplied by private companies that were backed by private financial oligarchies (Lancaster, 1989) . Further growth in the role of the state came with the nuclear programme, which was largely aimed at the production of electricity by private operator s but still involved some important policy decisions and institutionalisation of energy functions at the government. Two years later, in 1991, EdP was corporatized and became a public limited company, with public ownership but operating under private law. In 1996 the first decisive move towards privatization was made with the sale of 30 percent of EdP in the Lisbon stock exchange. This was followed by more offerings in 1997, 1998 and 2000 that reduced the government stake to about 33 percent. If privatization is one criterion of change in the electricity market, the other is government policy vis-à-vis independent power producers. Here it was Portugal that led the way, perhaps in the context of having more constraints on investment in electricity than Spain. While the first independent generators entered the Spanish market only at the end of the 1990s, Portugal had already made private investment in electricity legal in 1988. However, it was five more years before a private consortium in 1992 won an international tender to supply electricity in Portugal.
The move towards a more competitive environment was, however, very hesitant in both countries and focused mainly on competition in generation. In 1994, about two years before the creation of the EU regime for a single market in electricity, the Spanish government advanced competition in the generation segment of the industry while maintaining regulatory control over the transmission and distribution segments, and created an advisory regulatory agency (Curien and Matheu, 2001 ). Yet the law faced significant opposition from the established operators and was difficult to implement. With the rise of the centre-right government of the Popular Party, it was in effect suspended in 1996 (Lasheras, 1999, 292) . The Portuguese government made a similar move towards competition in generation in 1995, introducing legislation that recognized some generation activity as competitive and even before the consolidation of EU regime.
All in all, some strong indications are evident in both countries in the period before the 1996 regime , especially with respect to private ownership and the development of autonomous regulatory capacities. Specifically, we observe some moves towards independent regulatory authority in Portugal and a regulatory advisory agency in Spain already in 1994. In addition, we observe the opening of the market for independent power producers (in the case of Portugal) and the privatization of the public operators in both countries. Moreover, in both countries 
Electricity Liberalization in Spain and Portugal After 1996
We move now to the period after the creation of the European electricity regime in 1996. As already mentioned, the establishment of autonomous regulatory institutions in Spain and Portugal predates the new EU regime. The Spanish authority Comisión del Sector Eléctrico Nacional (CSEN), established in 1994, was renamed in 1997 Comisión Nacional del Sector Eléctrico (CNSE). A third act in 1998 renamed it Comisión Nacional de la Energia (CNE) and extended its authority to other segments of the energy sector. Nominally, the Spanish agency presents itself as an independent authority, yet this is hardly the case. Indeed, it is one of 'these kinds of agencies which provide advice to the ministry and are responsible for monitoring and arbitration, but have no definitive regulatory powers. In accordance with their advisory role, the areas of activity of these organizations are broadly defined to include most regulatory issues. Governance and decision-making structures and independent safeguards are similar to those adopted by independent regulatory agencies' (Ocaña, 2003, 22) .
Unlike the Spanish politicians, who were thus reluctant to delegate control and were careful to preserve their authority by making only a limited commitment to autonomous regulation outside the scope of competition laws, the Portuguese seem to follow the blueprint of independent regulatory authorities (Ocaña, 2003:20-22) . The Portuguese Regulatory Entity of Electricity Sector (ERSE) has operated since 1997 under legislation dating from 1995. In 2002, ERSE competences were extended to the autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores, and to natural gas, and thus it became to become known as the Regulatory Entity of Energy Services. Another important step, taken in 2002, was the creation of the Competition Authority, which also exercises some authority over energy markets.
Yet it is too early to assess its impact on the electricity market.
If in 1995 competition was understood to be possible and desirable in the generation segments of the Spanish and Portuguese electricity sectors, after 1996 competition was applied to consumers, and choice of suppliers -for eligible consumers -was guaranteed at least at the legal level and, following the agreement, at the EU level. After the suspension of the implementation of the pre-1996 liberalization act, the new centre-right government in Spain concluded a Electricity Protocol that was signed with the industry in 1996 and led to a new electricity law designed to create a new electricity regime. The New Electricity
Law came into force in January 1998 and introduced the liberalization of Unlike in the sphere of competition, in Portugal the restructuring of EdP was only minimal, and the market is still dominated by the former public operator. The market is thus horizontally concentrated and , to t he extent that vertical restructuring was promoted as a policy, this was already achieved in 1994. In that year, EdP was turned into a holding company and divided into six major independent subsidiaries, with one company for generation, one for transmission (REN), and four regional distribution companies. However, the restructuring did little to affect the dominance of the EdP, as all the subsidaries operate under the group's headquarters authority. Some important developments in this sphere It also reveals the limits of the European regime and of the concept of a single European market for electricity.
All in all, while the movement towards liberalization is consistent across the two periods, the creation of an EU regime for electricity in 1996 had an impact on the extension of the goals of competition for consumers by introducing eligibility for small consumers. Yet, while this goal is formalized at the level of laws and regulation, it is still far from a practical option for consumers, and since 2003 has been introduced very slowly, even in Spain. At a different level, we observe that the changes both in the governance level (autonomous regulatory authorities) and in the market (private ownership, competition) are becoming more legitimate over time in both countries (that is, especially after 1996). Those actors who moved along only reluctantly did not see it as a major threat to their essential interests. This is true at the level of government officials as well as at the corporate level of managers and employees. This observation, and especially the fact that the two countries proceeded with liberalization, first in advance of the creation of the European regime and later beyond its requirements, suggests that the European regime was not a major force behind liberalization.
V. Similarities and Differences across Sectors and Nations
We move on with our stepwise and iterative process of pair-wise comparisons to the aggregate level of liberalization and its relations to Europeanization. Instead of comparing the Spanish and Portuguese electricity and telecoms sectors, we now compare the Spanish and Portuguese liberalization policies and their relations to Europeanization. Instead of looking at the Spanish telecoms sector, the Spanish electricity sector, the Portuguese telecoms sector , and the Portuguese electricity sector, in this section we compare the telecoms sector in the two countries with the electricity sector in the two countries. In other words, we are 'casing' our units of analysis in a 'compound', higher level of aggregation. At the same time we aim at a systematic and holistic review of variations and similarities across these sectors and nations and use Table 2 as a heuristic device.
On the basis of our analysis, we expect European Union regimes to exert pressure for the creation of a single market in both sectors, but greater pressure for liberalization in telecoms than in electricity. We also expect Portugal and Spain to move reluctantly towards liberalization, though the degree of reluctance is expected to be higher in Portugal than in Spain. Finally, we expect liberalization to move ahead more forcefully in telecoms than in electricity due to the technological and economic characteristics of the two sectors. In the rest of this section we test these expectations against observations of four combinations of similarities and differences across the two countries and two sectors in order to draw some conclusions about the relations between Europeanization and liberalization. We discuss expectations, observations and implications in respect of each of the four combinations of differences and similarities. Europe. Table 2 about here This critical observation is expressed in table 2, where we argue that cross-sectoral variations are greater in Spain than in Portugal. This is reflected mainly in the lesser degree of independence that was granted to the Spanish electricity authority when compared to the telecoms agency (CMT) and the greater degree of emphasize on competition in telecoms than in electricity in this country. Sectoral variations are more pronounced in Spain probably because of the strong position of private electricity providers in Spain and their strong connection with central and regional governments. These established electricity providers while jumping on the liberalization bandwagon were careful to oppose changes that were potentially threatening to them. In Portugal where nationalization preceded the restructuring of the market and of governance, the government did not have to take into account the interests of the private industry and thus we see a more unified outcome that represents the 'national patterns ' of policy making. In Spain however, these interests, together with the state, were reluctant to grant too much authority to a new independent regulatory body. It is this respect of the entrenched private ownership of the electricity market in Spain that seems to explain better the ease of delegation in Portugal and the difficulties in Spain, and by implication the bigger variations in the privatization process.
VI. Conclusions
We are now in a position to summarize our findings concerning the process of Europeanization and to discuss its impact according to each of the five criteria that were set out in the introduction to this paper. Our emphasis on the limits of Europeanization should not be surprising at this stage. First, while we found a faster advance of liberalization after the creation of EU-level regimes for telecoms and electricity, we have some doubts whether this is indeed an effect of the EU regime. These doubts were first based on cross-regional analysis by Levi-Faur (2004a) but are confirmed in the context of the comparative analysis of this paper.
Liberalization of these sectors preceded the creation of a EU regime and indeed went further than its requirements. This is all the more evident when one examines the recent change in the electricity regime (2003/54/CE), which follows rather than leads development at the level of the nation-states. Second, we found significant variations in the patterns of market integration and governance reforms.
At the level of market integration we found that, despite considerable and, indeed (from the point of view of the beginning of the 1990s), surprising progress in liberalization, we cannot really point to any integration of Iberian telecoms and electricity markets into a Europe-wide region. What we have in fact is two distinct national markets with varying degrees of liberalization. The limited integration of the Spanish and Portuguese markets does not seem to us exceptional in Europe, and thus it reveal the limits of Europeanization. At the level of governance structure, we find national variations that are independent both of the process of market integration and of the process of Europeanization.
Third, and most important, we did not find evidence that the more limited degree of delegation upward to the EU in electricity (intergovernmental regime) than in telecoms had an impact on the national regimes in the sense that it made them less prone to liberalization. Liberalization at the national level in electricity moved swiftly beyond the requirements of the EU regime and, as has already been argued, before the EU followed these developments with the most recent regime change in the sector. Fourth, we observed that adherence to the rules of EU regimes, while constraining uncompetitive behaviour by governments and market incumbents, did not curtail it. In fact, there are still wide margins for strategic behaviour by politicians to pursue their 'national interest' policies. The two countries stuck to their 'national champions' policies; and what is most puzzling is the extent to which governments and national communities could adhere to EU rules on the one hand but continue to be engaged in mercantilist policies on the other. Finally, the telecoms and electricity operators' strategies of internationalization seem to be directed more to Latin America and forme r colonies than to Europe. While arguments about the advance of the 'single market' lead us to expect that telecoms and electricity companies' strategies of internationalization will correspond to the new opportunities and constraints of Europeanization, the evidence for this is limited, at least at present.
Our findings on the limits of Europeanization have two important implications.
First, we suggest that Europeanization should not be viewed as the motor of liberalization and thus that we should look elsewhere for an understanding of the diffusion of liberalization around the world. Second, we suggest that, even under the EU-level regime , there is enough legal and political room for national actors to pursue mercantilist policies. One caveat before we conclude: while we focus on the limits of Europeanization, we do not suggest that it is not important.
Europeanization, unlike liberalization, might move too slowly to be clearly visible.
It may well be that the formation of a single market will take longer than was expected. Indeed, it may still take several decades and there is no certainty about the result. Yet, unlike Europeanization, liberalization in a national context was a quite rapid policy change, which suggests again that Europeanization was not the central driving force behind these processes; and while it has certainly not prevented mercantilist policies, it has certainly established another set of policy constraints (and opportunities) for Spanish and Portuguese actors to take into account. Observations : There is clear and strong evidence of cross-national and cross-sectoral similarities in the movement towards more liberal regimes, but ones which are open enough to the promotion of national interest and national champions.
Implications:
The observations do not support the expectation about a strong impact for Europeanization on the extent of liberalization.
Expectations: Liberalization in electricity would develop quite slowly in comparison with telecoms. National variations will be minimal in scope in comparison with the sectoral one.
Observations: variations in the structure of governance and market opening are less distinctive than expected. The variations in the degree of competition are mainly the result of technological and economic characteristics of the sectors Implications : Stronger propensity for competition telecoms and a supranational regime at the EU level did not prevent the two countries moving towards liberalization despite the constraints on competition in electricity and despite the lesser pressure from the EU in this respect.
Crossnational Variations
Expectations: Portugal's social étatism will result in a lesser propensity for liberalization than Spanish liberal étatism. Crosssectoral variations will be minimal.
Observations :
The Portuguese moved more slowly than the Spanish on competition but were more inclined to delegate authority to the regulatory agencies.
Implications : Nations and may better explain variations in p ublic policy than variations in EU regimes. The arguments about the critical importance of Europeanization as major force of change are qualified.
Expectations:
The creation of EU regimes will produce both sectoral and national variations but the degree of variations will differ across nations and sectors Observations: Sectoral differences in Spain are greater than in Portugal. At the level of both governance and market, Spanish electricity differs from telecoms to a larger extent than in Portugal. Cross-national variations at both sectors are bigger at the level of governance than the market.
Implications :
The strength of private actors in Spanish electricity and their relative weakness in Portugal seem to explain better than Europeanization the balanc e of private-public power and the dynamics of Spanish liberalization.
